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Abstract 
The idea, mechanism, process and the outcome of petition in rural China is an interesting 
subject to research, which brings out some fascinating aspects of peasant’s grievances 
redressal in the contemporary state-society relationship in the Chinese countryside. This 
research, while interrogating various theoretical strands on peasants’ participation and 
protest, and undertaking fieldwork in the Shanxi province attempts to understand and 
explain why and how the peasants act in a particular way in the context of specific 
situations, and how does the state negotiate and respond to their grievances in an effective 
ways thereby preventing the emergence of discontent towards the system and reinforcing 
its own credibility and legitimacy.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
First authorized in 1951, the petitioning system in China has become one of the most 
important institutional establishments to supplement the party-state’s ruling and to 
broaden the scale of institutional information flow. Petition, also known as xinfang, refers 
to citizens (gongmin), legal representatives or other organizations making claims, 
expressing opinions, engaging the governments at all levels and letters and visits 
departments higher than county bureaucratic level to respond their requests through calls, 
letters, fax, online communications and visits (State Council 2005, 2). More specifically, 
it is a format of people expressing expectations and suggestions, articulating discontents, 
or reporting local governance abuses to government institutions (SBLC 2005). 1 
Reinvented from the Mass Line theory of Mao Zedong, the petitioning system was 
recognized as the institutionalized channel for promoting the communication between the 
party-state and society and “alleviating the oppositional relationship between the Party 
and mass” (Liu 1985, 44). This notion is based on the dichotomy of Mao’s theory but 
cannot generalize to the subtle and interactive state-society relations in the current 
transitioning China. Undeniably, the opposition, or contention, is to a certain extent 
implied in petitioning; however, it is not a cleavage between two spaces. As an 
interactive and constructive process, it has been continuously shaped and reshaped by 
various elements inside or outside the contentious space. Thus, how to understand the 
contention between powers and realms become a key to interpreting the transition of and 
the logic behind this action.  
 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
1 SBLC, the abbreviation of “State Bureau of Letters and Calls”. 
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CHAPTER I: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
1.1 Western Context 
 
The term of petition has a long history since the imperial China, but the contemporary 
theories are rooted in the growing study of social movements during the 1860s, when the 
Europe and America were experiencing the massive popular campaigns, collective 
protests, and social demanding for human rights. The transition from cost-benefit 
interpretations to psychological explanation marked an emerging innovative theoretical 
perspective. A famous framework coming from the social learning theory, at that time, 
was the “frustration-aggression” hypothesis, which refers to a reactive aggressiveness 
resulting from people’s grievances or frustrations (Perry 2008, 4). With the focus on the 
inner motivation of conflicting behavior, Ted Robert Gurr, as one of the exemplars in the 
social psychological school of thoughts, raised a new concept- relative deprivation-to 
explain the underlying roots of social violence and people’s aggressive protests (Jessop 
1971, 271; Wang & Huang 2012, 41). While it lends insights into the influence of 
structural factors, it also has been criticized in 1) ignoring the ideological variables (Xie 
& Cao 2009, 14); 2) limited to the perspective of participants and unclear with the 
interactive relations (Perry 2008, 5); 3) insufficient in explaining the “tipping point” for 
people’s recourse to rebellion (Perry 2008, 5).   
 
 As an answer to the frustration-aggression hypothesis, John McCarthy and Mayer 
Zald raised an alternative theory: resource-mobilization, incorporating the aspect of 
“representativeness”, that is, the discontented people are not the only collectivity 
involved in the social movement; they may also “represent” other “outside resources” 
(McCarthy & Zald 1977, 1216-1217). This model, in fact, went beyond the scope of 
psychological “grievances” and took into consideration the structural factors and their 
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cooperative or competitive interrelation with the people. And the people were not seen as 
a homogeneous group: their roles varied from the “mobilizing supporters” to the 
sympathetic publics. The theory of resource-mobilization offers new insights by bringing 
into the social organizations and, more importantly, the media. Later, the sophisticated 
model illustrating the interplay of shared interests, mobilization, organization within 
regarding the formation of contending group, and the relationship between government of 
repression/facilitation and opportunity/threat illustrated by Charles Tilly furthers the 
theory of resource-mobilization. In his causal analytical framework, the likeliness of one 
to participate in the collective action depends on the collective “resource” control of the 
perceived advantages or disadvantages in terms of potential interactions with other 
outside contenders, the common identity and unified interaction structure, and the 
anticipated successfulness for a participant to realize his own interest through collective 
actions (Tilly 1978, Chapter 3: 4-7,19). However, the resource-mobilization models holds 
an assumption of the rational and “objective” choice and arrangement in the making of 
collective actions, which is insufficient to solve the irrational behaviors of the participants, 
which is not a rare phenomenon in the surrounding world (Cohen 1985, 674).  
 
Evolving from the social movement study and resource mobilization theory, 
contentious politics provides a significant paradigm that emerged from the Western 
context, then introduced into China in recent two decades as one of the most influential 
models to understand petitioning in the grassroots society. Considered as the derivative 
phenomenon of the modern state formation in the eighteenth century, contentious politics 
theory incorporates and emphasizes the various roles of the state. Sidney Tarrow pointed 
out the necessity of formal access to institutions in the formation of contenders; the 
contention lies in the fundamentally oppositional relationship between institutionally 
marginalized group and powerful authorities (Tarrow 1998, 187). While Tarrow’s first 
analytical framework still entails the traces of social movement models, Charles Tilly, 
together with Tarrow, furthered the previous attempts of theoretical innovation and 
formalized a more comprehensive problematique of contentious politics. According to his 
definition, contentious politics, seen as a way of popular claim making, is essentially the 
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intersection of three broad sets: contention, collective action and politics (Tilly & Tarrow 
2007, 7). This conceptualization broadens the scale of studies, moving away from the 
former barrier between different formats of actions. The static opposition between the 
“realms” becomes the dynamic contention of powers.  
 
When contextual variables were identified and emphasized, the subaltern paradigm 
also formulated a different narrative of the peasant resistance in India and Southeast Asia. 
Started in the 1980s and expanded in the era of globalization, it has shown its great 
influence on the understanding of discourses of political movement in developing 
countries, which has laid the foundation of subaltern studies from the perspective of the 
bottom society. Different from analyzing the open, large-scale confrontations, or the 
well-integrated organization of protestors, James C. Scott presents us with a picture of 
nuanced, routine, cautious resistance (i.e. false compliance or feigned ignorance) of the 
subordinate peasants in the daily life with subtle tactics to defend their own interest 
through a long history against the ideological hegemonic power, whose perspective is 
then widely adopted in analyzing the petitioning in China’s countryside (Scott 1985).  
 
1.2 Studies in China  
 
The relationship between the state and society is evolving interactively and conflicting, 
based on which appeals and petitions are performed consequent to the contentions of 
powers and wills. This perspective is reflected in two analytical frameworks of the 
origins and behavioral logic behind rural petitions in China: 1) rightful resistance (yifa 
kangzheng) (Fang 2000; O’Brien 2013; O’Brien & Li 2006; Ying 2007; Yu 2005) and 2) 
subaltern resistance (diceng kangzheng) (Perry 2008; Wang 2010).     
 
First raised by O’Brien and Li, “rightful resistance” became the dominant analytical 
framework and was widely accepted by scholars studying the rural contentions and 
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conflicts between institutional and non-institutional actors in China during the late 1990s 
and early 2000s. Their research in the Chinese countryside reveals a divergent 
phenomenon of people in the most subordinate class in Scott’s field study. Peasants in 
China, the counterpart of the resisters in Malaysian villages, did not adopt either a silent 
way of resistance as analyzed by the subaltern school, or a rebellious action that is widely 
studied in the Western social movement models, to defend themselves from the strong 
state power. Instead, they resist not only openly but also skillfully: they have a political 
sensitivity to a certain degree to fill themselves into the opportunity space created by the 
institutional; moreover, they can further use the official languages and government 
rhetoric as their “weapon” to “curb the exercise of power” (O’Brien 2013, 1051-1052), 
which, in turn, made themselves the shaper of the fluid boundary of state-society spaces.  
 
The variation of this framework lies in the extent of emphasis on “peasantness” 
and ”state-centeredness”, which is based upon the recognition of the commonalities in 
making alliance with officials, relying on institutional channels, through the strategy of 
persuasive, normative, official languages, etc (O’Brien 2013). In accordance with 
Western paradigm of resource-mobilization, this framework also sees the resistant 
behavior as a rational calculation and a utilization of accessible resources and networks. 
This rationalist analytical thread has been constructed by discourses of “rights”(quanli) 
and ”interests”(quanyi) in China, underlying which is a defensive action to the location 
and exploitation of state’s power into personal life.  
 
In accordance with the western studies of social movements and collective actions, 
the “rightful resistance” paradigm works by seeing the petition as a manifestation of the 
rising political awareness of the petitioners. Yu furthers this illustration by looking at the 
“organized resistance” in rural China (Yu 2005). His argument presents us with the 
formation of peasants’ right-protection “team” (nongmin weiquan duiwu) in a small 
county of Hunan Province, which is depicted by Yu as the “peasant representatives with 
definite beliefs”. They technically used the word “team” instead of “organization” to 
legitimize their activities and make their resistance “rightful” in the political context of 
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China. However, from his work we can only see the active role played by rural elites; 
there is not much information about the ordinary plebeians whom are implicitly regarded 
as the passive actor in the practice of collective petition. When considering Wooyeal 
Paik’s argument about the local elites, which are the economical and institutional 
beneficiaries in the grassroots society, the elites-leading “rightful resistance” perspective 
has generated a heated contention among Chinese scholars.  
 
 The “subaltern resistance” framework criticizes the complication and over-
rationalization of peasants’ response, incorporating “emotion” into their behavioral logic. 
One of the prominent indigenization in this line is conducted by Ying Xing. In his 
argument, the hinge of rural resistance largely depends on the emotion (qi) formed 
through moral experience and cultural context of China, which not only follows the 
subaltern narrative but also resonates in accordance with Aminzade and McAdam’s 
highlighting the cognitive, structural and sociocultural aspects of emotion (Aminzade & 
McAdam 2001, 18).  
 
The theory of qi supplements Scott’s framework in highlighting the moral aspect of 
peasant everyday resistance, which also goes beyond the early Western psychological 
interpretation in incorporating cultural constructions. In spite of Ying Xing’s interpreting 
qi as 1) physiologically, the substance of life and the instinct of self-protection 2) 
psychologically, the demand of self-esteem, and 3) socially, the motivation of moving up 
and realizing moral personality, it is still a framework full of ambiguity, which attributes 
to its various semantic meaning associated with different aspects of peasant resistance: 
the spirit of grassroots activists is qi, and the grievances accumulation is also qi; qi is not 
only a courageous personality, but also psychologically discontents. Although with 
language ambiguities, qi, as an inner motivation, is confirmed as a result of state’s 
suppression through the bureaucratic pressure as well as the lacking of expressive 
mechanism of interests (Ying 2011, 112). Thus, the active participation of peasants in 
petition sometimes can be an “anger-venting” social incident, in this sense (Yu 2008).  
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Two mainstream frameworks appear to be, at first glance, reactive in explaining the 
forming of rural participation as a defensive strategy against state’s power penetration for 
the living space. The difference lies in the emphases on rationality in strategic 
mobilization and emotion accumulation as well as grievance-induced justice seeking. In 
the same time, implied by both of them is an increase of proactive and participatory 
involvement of the people into the political life consequent to the changing role through 
structural reform in the rural society of China. Other changes including the setting of 
village elections, increased social mobility and diversified media channel also play a part 
in expanding peasants’ participatory opportunities (Oi 2004, 264). In this respect, 
whether the “state is the first mover” (O’Brien 2013, 1053-1054) need to be further 
considered.  
 
Another paradigm, different from the previous two that focus on the “contentious 
politics” or non-political resistance marked with either political aspirations or “survival 
tactics”, which instead emphasizes the non-contentious trickery adopted by a certain 
peasants as a way of making benefits from related policies. The case of unreasonable 
petition in Shen’s research (Shen 2010) and the emerging “professional petitioners” in 
Tian’s work (Tian 2010) have presented us with a specifically contextualized perspective 
of looking at the making of collective petition in rural China.  
 
 In general, a large number of the existing studies confirm the tendency of trying to 
attribute the practice of petition either to a macro explanation- the deficiency of political 
system in China, or to a micro behavioral analysis- the external influence factor of social 
adversities or the peasant ideology (xiaonongyishi). However, studies about the proactive 
role of petitioners are still not explored adequately in the Chinese context. Although the 
petition narratives in conventional researches vary from one region to another, covering 
different situations and backgrounds, the study of the dynamics of collective petition still 
needs further thoughts for future research: the variations within a collectivity, the 
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function of the group structure, the mobilization of social resources, the interplay of 
group interests and their expression, all of which need deeper research, analysis and 
reflections.. 
In this context, this study seeks to examine the context, nature and operationalization 
of collective petition in rural China and the relationship between actors involved, in order 
to get insights into the rationales behind peasants’ objectives, involvement and attainment 
in the process of petitioning. 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
While making an attempt to explore the collective petition in rural China this will raise 
the following questions: 
 
1) Who are the petitioners, the main actors in the game of petitioning? 
 
2) What does stimulate and motivate them to raise their voice and demands? 
 
3) Whether and how do their personal/individual demands negotiate with the collective 
and what is the nature of interplay between one group with another? 
 
4) How do the petitioners get organized and mobilized and who to they approach for 
‘solution’? 
 
5) What is the existing party/state mechanism for grievance redressal and how do the 
petitioners negotiate with this mechanism? 
 
6) How do the party and the state respond to the petition? 
 
7) How does the state reinforce its accountability and legitimacy in the entire process?  
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1.4 Methodology 
 
1.4.1 Study Methods 
 
To get the primary empirical data of the modes, process, and participants’ perception of 
petition in rural China, the method adopted in this study is mainly the qualitative, semi-
structured interviews with open-ended questions. Since the situation of petition is a 
complex reality and what this study proposes to present primarily associates with 
intangible elements of people’s political experience, such as the social norms and cultural 
backgrounds in the context, the qualitative methods becomes an suitable choice. Another 
important reason of qualitative choice relates to the analytical objective of this study. To 
better interpret petitioners’ behaviors, feelings, expectations, opinions and perceptions of 
the activities they mobilize or involved in, the semi-structured in-depth interview also has 
its advantage in acquiring the information through people telling their personal stories 
from their own perspectives. The third factor regarding my choice of methods lies in the 
fact that doing field research is also a process of formulating the research perspective and 
questions. In this respect, the qualitative approach is more flexible and adaptive. Finally, 
the choice of methods also depends on whom I had to acquire information from. For 
villagers, approaching them, getting acquainted with them and having a face-to-face 
interaction is relatively much better than handing out rigid questionnaires to get their 
cooperation.  
 
1.4.2 Sampling  
 
The sampling methods employed in this study are convenience sampling and purposeful 
sampling at different stages. The field research started from approaching a most 
accessible subject in Qigen village who then identified three persons as “activists (jiji 
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fenzi)” in both Qigen and Ningai villages. The reasons that he was chosen as a suitable 
key informant consists in three main factors: 1) he had the experiences of dealing with 
petition issues; 2) he had a rich social network and the potential to access diverse village 
members to realize variation maximum at the next stage (Marshall 1996); 3) he was 
willing and able to communicate his information to the researcher (Burgess 2003).  
 
The second stages involved approaching members within villages. During this stage, the 
use of strategy was purposeful sampling. Within the practical limitation of time 
framework, an attempt was made to acquire information from a wide range of subjects as 
much as possible in terms of their specific experience， their role played during the 
making of appealing, and their personal perceptions of petition. Since the relationship is 
one of the important aspects of study, the use of snowball sampling here was very 
effective when one subject recommended another potential interviewee.  
 
1.4.3 Scale, Time, and Participants 
 
This fieldwork was carried out mainly at village and township level in three places of the 
south part of Pingding County, Shanxi Province. The whole field research was conducted 
in July and August 2015, during 19 days at two stages. 14 participants were interviewed 
during the field research. The participants can be divided into four categories: first, the 
village cadre group, referring to people who are either in the Communist Party 
Committee or the government personnel at village/ county level; second, the “ordinary” 
peasants with the experience of petition; Third, the elite “activist” who had relatively 
higher level of education, was born in a relatively rich family, or has strong kinship 
networks within a or beyond the village; Fourth, the “others”, such as the wife of the 
former township leader.  
 
1.4.4 Limitation 
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The fieldwork has been constrained by three main factors. First, the tight time budget 
made it very difficult to expand the field scale to the whole county. Thus, the research is 
mainly a descriptive illustration of the southern area of Pingding, the eastern part of 
Shanxi. Second, due to the urbanization and the migrating lifestyle of a certain peasants, 
some interviewees, especially the village elites, had their personal houses in different 
places from village level to city level, which brought difficulties to the researcher in 
deciding their residence location. Third, although with the spread of standardized 
Mandarin through both education and media platforms, most of the interviewees can only 
speak dialect, some of which can only understand this dialect. An attempt was made to 
learn their daily dialect for basic communication; however, sometimes an additional 
ministrant was still needed, which might influence the accuracy of information provided.  
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CHAPTER II: HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 
People’s participation in petitioning is a historical product, during which its basic 
contents, incentives, modes of actions, and interactions within or beyond the system are 
varying with China’s economic, social and political transitioning experiences.  
 
2.1 First period: 1951-1978 
 
Right after the establishment of People’s Republic of China in 1949, the General Office 
of the CPC Central Committee was set up based on the function of its predecessor-
Central Secretarial Office, undertaking the responsibility to process the letters mailed by 
the masses to ask question to central leaders. After the Office submitted the statistical 
result of tens of thousands of letters from across the country in the first quarter of 1951, 
Mao Zedong made his famous comments, which became the foundation of petitioning 
system building in the contemporary China: 
 
“We must attach great importance to the communication with people- properly 
respond to and meet the valid demands of them, and regard it as a channel for 
strengthening the communication between the Communist Party and the masses.”2  
——Mao, Zengdong 1951 
 
 According to Mao’s comments, the institutionalization of petitioning system was 
first put forward in the same year by Government Administration Council and formally 
authorized in 1957. It was emphasized that receiving and handling people’s letters and 
visits required an independent institution from central Office down to above-county level, 
																																								 																				
2	See	Mao	Zengdong.	The	comments	on	the	report	of	General	Office	of	CPC	Central	Committee	regarding	people’s	
letter.	(Manuscripts	of	Mao	Zedong	since	1949,	1996):	310.			
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and an individual department leader with full responsibility and authority. Premier Zhou 
Enlai pointed out the aim of system building is to guarantee people’s democratic rights 
and setting up a supervision mechanism for administrations (Zhou 1957). It also marked a 
changed meaning of “mass” - from the worker-peasant-intelligentsia alliance during the 
wartime to a homogeneous group with an abstract identity of the renmin qunzhong, which 
played a significant role in the politicization of petitioning for decades. 
 
2.1.1 Three-Anti/ Five-Anti movement and Sufan Compaign 
 
Starting at the end of 1951, the party-purging campaign is the first mobilization of mass 
participation after Mao’s comment to combat corruption, resist extravagance, and fight 
bureaucratism. Petitioning, at that time, was a highly effective strategy supporting 
political mobilization. Aside from receiving opinions in the office, cadres actively visited 
individual households to encourage them to write accusation letters. And for people who 
participated, they were widely praised by government leaders on/in official newspapers 
(Feng 2012, 33). At that time, the Party showed extraordinary concern towards people’s 
opinions: when a petitioner from Shanxi faced problem during his visits, he could get 
help from the CPC Central committee of North China Bureau’s direct intervention and 
even then became the headline of the People’s Daily (Feng 2012, 33-34). 
 
 Pressures from public opinion and pervasive information capturing through mass 
participation were a vital element in this revolutionary movement, intensifying the 
situation in the party, government, military and people’s everyday life. And this 
enthusiasm then spread to the private business and industry, leading to the socialist 
transition against private ownership since 1956. According to an editorial of People’s 
Daily, people’s petitioning “1) effectively achieved bottom-up supervision, 2) 
strengthened connections between Party and people, 3) realized the liberty of speech 
(CPC People 2016).” 
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2.1.2 Rectification Movement and Anti-Rightist Movement 
 
On 27th of April in 1957, the Central Committee of the CCP announced an instruction, 
encouraging mass participation in the rectification movement to fight bureaucratism, 
sectarianism, and subjectivism within the Communist Party. When the alternative ideas 
and criticisms from intellectuals and other democratic parties distracted CCP’s initial 
focus from grassroots participation to the leadership of the state, the involvement was 
suppressed. Six months later, the Central Committee launched another political 
movement in order to purge the rightists out of the party and society. A large number of 
intellectuals were reported by their neighbors or families, and defined as the capitalist 
class, lying in front of which were a clear line between them and the “masses”.    
 
 While the year of 1957 marked the first peak of petitioning after the establishment 
of PRC, the system building was still sluggish (Feng 2012, 36). It was still regarded as a 
secretarial work, and without a separate institution, a number of cadres in charge of 
proceeding letters and visits of people were just “doing a part-time job”. Aside from the 
procedural requirements including receiving letters and registration, devising and 
reminding of handling, inspecting and responding, filing the letters, receiving visits, etc., 
the directions on system setting was only the “hierarchical and divisional proceeding” 
(fenji fuze, guikou banli).3 Not until in 1963 did the State council launch an Ordinance to 
establish specialized institutions of letters and visits and assigned administrative level to 
it (Diao 1996, 389-397). 
 
2.1.3 Cultural Revolution 
 
																																								 																				
3	See	CPC	Central	Committee	General	Office,	General	Office	of	State	Council.	The	compilation	of	national	petitioning	
mateirals.	1989:	53-55.	
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Since the convening of first national conference of letters and visits in 1957, people’s 
petitioning was mainly performing the role of serving the political movements. The 
official determination on the nature of petitioning is “contradictions among the people”, 
but this “contradiction” was highly mobilized based on the ideological arousal and 
strategically employed by inner-party powers (Feng 2012, 37). 
 
 Rather than functioned as an institutionalized supervision mechanism, people’s 
petitioning was instrumentalized to legitimate the behavior of all-inclusive 
revolutionization. Started from the 1960s, the Cultural Revolution to a great extent 
hindered the institutionalization of petitioning system: in the locality, former petitioning 
settings and offices were abrogated or reorganized; in the center, not only a huge number 
of letters and visits put a heavy burden on the officials, but also accusations of the Office 
of Letters and Visits from the masses created a chaotic situation in the administration 
procedure. 
 
 The first period of petitioning in China reflects the mobilization-oriented or 
revolution-oriented perspective of the mass participation. Different from the Western 
social movement and mobilization trajectory, petitioning in China during these two 
decades was constrained within a strong vertical configuration of power inequality 
between the petitioner and the party-state, lacking a horizontal, spontaneous 
organizational structure. People here were the subject of mobilization rather than the 
initiator of collective actions; petitioning was given a prominent function of the most 
extensive and effective support of political movements. Other featured characteristics of 
the masses petitioning during the revolutionary era includes the following:  
 
Firstly, as a hegemonic discourse, it to some extent replaced judicial institutions to 
exercise verdict, impairing the administration of justice and the accountability of the legal 
system; secondly, it focused on the functional meaning of the masses as a political entity 
rather than the heterogeneous individuals with own personalities and specialties; thirdly, 
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the cross-cutting inspection and the mutual communication between the masses and state 
formed a hierarchical information flow system, however, it is not a “strict command” 
political structure (Shih 1999, 155): people were not only mobilized by the state but also 
considered by people themselves that they were important to push forward the campaigns 
- “from the masses, to the masses”; from the bottom to the center; and finally, the 
changing connotation of the “masses” reflected that a presupposed “enemy” and the scale 
of grievances were the “aim” of petitioning, that is, the opposition was not between the 
state and society, but between the “pure” masses and the ideological opponents.  
 
 
2.2 Second period: 1978-2004 
 
After the end of Cultural Revolution, a growing number of letters and visits appealing to 
the Party leaders for political rehabilitation was a manifestation of the urgency to 
establish a sound petitioning system. In 1978, The Third Plenary Session of the 11th 
Central Committee marked a historical transition of the fundamental policy in China, that 
is, from “class struggle” to “economic development”. In the same year, the Second 
National Conference of Letters and Visits was held in Bejing, and the leading principle of 
handling people’s petitioning was, accordingly, changed from the politically based 
mobilization to solving the practical problems, and from the focus on state-level 
revolutionary targets to people’s vital interests (Feng 2012, 38). 
 
 Petitioning during this period can be broadly categorized into three stages based 
on the differences of the themes with a dividing line of the year of 1982 and 1992. Stage 
one is the Post-Cultural Revolution era (from 1978 to 1982), which mainly focused on the 
restoration and reconstruction of the petitioning system (Ying 2013, 5). Instead of saying 
that it was a new period of normalizing the institution, clearing up the long pending 
grievances and appeals consequent to the revolution to prepare for the social economic 
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incentivation became the core part. A fundamental change was proceeding: the target of 
fighting the enemy turned to maintaining the “Unity” (Tuan Jie) (Feng 2012, 38). This 
unity was the basis of Deng Xiaoping’s normalization of the Party’s bureaucratic system 
from disarray (Shaw 1996, 68). 
 
 On the 22th of October in 1978, the publication of an editorial in People’s Daily 
confirmed the complexity of petitioning and made a classification of problems raised by 
petitioners, among which the negative and problematic aspects were first mentioned as 
the turning point of system building, including the urgency of punishing people “making 
unreasonable economic demand”, and “intentionally making trouble for administration”, 
and pointing out the harm of “bypass local authorities for petitioning” (Wu 2009). 
Compared to the encouragement and supportive attitude during the revolutionary era, the 
ideal of the system building became “conflict-alleviation” for economic priority (Feng 
2012, 43). Order and efficiency was the main theme of the institutional building, and 
from the perspective of the state, it was the rationality and pragmatic attitude of people 
that should be appreciated. The party-state changed its role of the mobilization initiator to 
the regulation maintainer regarding petitioning (Ying 2013).  
 
Petitioners should abide by state laws and policies, obeying related regulations on 
petitioning released by office of letters and visits… For petitioners whose request 
has been dealt with but refutes to leave even under persuasion and education, the 
department of letters and visits can issue the official letter for security department to 
send them back… Petitioners with lepriasis should be examined by health 
department.4 
 
——The State Council, 1980(214) 
 
																																								 																				
4	See	The	State	Council.	Regulations	on	maintaining	the	order	of	petitioning	handling.	1980	(214).	
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 The second stage is the first period of formal institutionalization of petitioning 
system. The Third National Conference of Letters and Visits was held on February, 1982. 
Issued in the same year, the Provisional regulation on Party and Government Offices 
handling Letters and Visits clarified the leadership and institutional settings of the 
formalization of petitioning: party committees at all levels and government are in charge 
of the proceeding and handling of letters and visits from the people; the Bureau of Letters 
and Visits (Xin Fang Ju) is set up in the General Office of Party Central Committee and 
State Council (Diao 1996, 398-402). Besides, the hierarchical settings were established 
according to the bureaucratic system, targeted with promoting the integration of society. 
During this period, what people petitioned for varied from accusation governance abuses 
to criticizing related policies when they impaired people’s individual interests, breaking 
away from complying with “grand political aim” and coming back to evaluating 
pragmatic benefit (Ying 2013).  
 
From 1978 to 1980, the system building was based on the political stability 
controlled by the “strong state”, whose direct initiation and intervention was the basis of 
the reform efficiency. Although the decollectivization in the early 1980s led to the 
weakening of the Party’s power penetration in the rural society, the marketization was not 
incorporated into rural reform and there was not obvious polarization between the rich 
and the poor in the countryside; on the contrary, started from 1984, the urban reform in 
China generated a wide instability resulting from the resource reorganization (Wang 
2008). Meanwhile, the concern about neoliberalism became gradually intense during the 
increasing social differentiation and stratification consequent to the economic reform. 
The heterogeneity of people and economic groups led to the division and conflicts of 
interests, and what petitioners were concerned was less about “unity” but more about 
individual perception and the shared experiences of their cohort (Cai 2008). The 
Intellectuals’ participation in public administration, at that time, was seen as a 
counteracting force to control and balance the within-party powers, helping “rectify” the 
cronyism of political factions (Shaw 1996, 70). This open competition encouraged young 
intelligentsia’s expectation on comprehensive social reform, however, the difference 
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between the severe inefficiency and corruption in government, state’s control of the press, 
and their pursuing for social welfare created a huge frustration among them, which 
leading to a increasingly intensive situation of collective petitioning and protests. 
 
 The third stage is marked by the restart of reform and radical marketization in 
1992, without the related democratic supervision mechanism, to a great extent leading to 
a wide social problem including localism, unemployment, corruption, smuggling, etc. in 
the following years. The Fourth National Conference of Letters and Visits was held on 
October, 1995, during which the first official Regulation on Letters and Visits was issued, 
indicating the transition of administrative ideal from “maintaining unity” to “maintaining 
stability” (weiwen) (Ying 2013, 5-6). In the Regulation, the conceptualization of 
“petitioner” (xinfangren), rather than the former political unity of the masses, marked the 
start of depoliticization and legislation of the petitioning system (Feng 2012, 45).  
 
 From 1992 to 2004, petitioning in China has experienced a continuous, large-scale 
increase in terms of its aggregation and range, which caused a tide of theoretical research 
and institutional study of China’s petitioning process and system. Shifting from the 
intellectual-leading-massive participation, petitioning diffused regarding its participants 
and gradually became an event-based claim making. The land acquisition of nation-wide 
constructions, mega project-induced displacement and grassroots autonomy-caused 
conflicting interests led to the re-involvement of grievances addressing by rural residents. 
The year 2003 witnessed the “flood peak” of petitioning (xinfang hongfeng) in China: it 
was not only about the absolute quantity of petitioning letters and visits, but more 
importantly, the increasing “up-going” pressure (shangxing yali) posed by people 
skipping over bureaucratic system and legal procedure, resorting to the national bureau in 
Beijing or the General Office collectively, which to a great extent complicated and 
challenged the institutionalization and legalization procedure proposed by the state (Yu 
2005, 71-72).  
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In 2003, the number of petitions received by National Bureau of Letters and Visits 
has risen by 14%, while there was only 0.1% increase at provincial level and 0.3% at 
prefectural level. On the country, the number of appeals accepted by county level has 
decreased by 2.4%. Besides, cases received by Central Committee and national 
government offices have grown by 46%, while there has only been a slight increase 
or even decrease in provincial, prefectural, and county government.5 
——National Bureau of Letters and Visits 
 
The numbers of collective petitioning cases and petitioners received by Party and 
government departments in 2003 are 315,000 and 7,120,000, respectively, with a 
increase of 41% and 44.8%, compared to the year 2002. Among them, the number of 
petitioning group with more than 50 people has increased by 33.3%; the number of 
people in one case of petition even reached 800.6  
—— Yu Jianrong 
 
 
 The second period of petitioning features several significant shifts with the 
dramatic transitioning context of China. 1) From social mobilization to “solving” 
(sometimes it is “suppressing”) conflicts, the State has changed its emphasis from 
“extracting out” contradictions to merging the whole society in order to guarantee the 
domestic functioning and carry out the reform based on its strong will; 2) the 
institutionalization of petitioning system marked an important change from the state’s 
expectation of petitioners on “delivering the information” (xinxi chuanda) to “expressing 
grievances upward” (minyi shangda), which not only offered an accessible channel as a 
supplement remedy of judicial institution, but also intended to “keep things under 
control”; 3) the experiences of petitioning during this period mirrors that petitioners, to a 
certain extent, have given a negative meaning to it in their connecting petition with 
																																								 																				
5	See	Zhao	Ling.	China’s	first	report	on	Xinfang	work	receives	high-level	attention.	(Southern	Weekly.	2004).	
6	See	Yu	Jianrong.	The	reform	of	petitioning	system	and	constitutional	construction.	(	21th	Century,	2005):71.	
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unsolvable “problems” and “injustice” of themselves, rather than focusing on 
constructively evaluating their society. And it showed a strong tendency to be an event-
based and interest-oriented collective action.  
 
2.3 Third period: 2005-Present  
  
On January 5th of 2005, the modified Regulation on Letters and Visits was authorized in 
the 76th executive meeting of the State Council, which redefined the valid scope and 
repositioned the role of petitioning system, marking the transition from bureaucratic 
suppression to the functionalization of petitioning as an administration-supplementary 
strategy in order to mediate the state-society relationship resulting from the insufficiency 
of legal system in dealing with civil conflicts and grievances. 
 
 The modified Regulation emphasized the necessity of incorporating the rule of 
law into petitioning system, highlighting the procedural, normalized, bureaucratized 
operation and administration to “keep things local” (jiudi jiejue) and alleviate the 
pressure of higher level. During this period, what people petition is not as important as to 
whom they resort to and how they perform. The new Regulation not only stressed 
protection for petitioners from the government retaliation, but more importantly, 
encouraged people to seek justice from law, supplementing petitioning administration 
with hearing system and involving social organizations’ intervention to promote public 
trust on State’s determination of Rule of Law.  
 
The deepened reform of petitioning systems depends on the direction of Rule of Law, 
which is also the essential key to overcoming the administration difficulties of 
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petition. The relationship of petitioning and Rule of Law will be increasingly closer, 
and the legalization of petitioning system is our ultimate destiny.7  
——People’s Daily, 2015  
  
On the other hand, while the state tended to define social confrontations as from 
economic conflicting roots, the society, among which the huge transition happened in the 
countryside, started to claim their political rights and participation rather than only 
weighing their gains and losses economically; the fundamental conflicts, according to 
Feng, lie in the dissimilar ways of perceiving petitioning as a functionally “conflict-
resolving” method or “participatory” opportunity (Feng 2012, 44). In this sense, people’s 
perception and motivation of petition becomes a key to understanding the system.  
 
2.4. Participatory petition in the countryside 
 
Along with the development of society, the role played by state and its orientation has 
been evolving. What we can see from the progressing history is that the petitioner is not 
the starting point of the action of petitioning. The logic lies in the fact that people, no 
matter intellectuals or the masses, seldom claimed what they “want”; instead, they are 
always discontented with what they do not like. The way of expressing mirrors that 
petitioning can be regarded as a responsive, reactive action to state’s policy. This is a way 
of seeing that halts and separates the circulation of the mass line system, we can still find 
numerous analyses see the origin of petition as a unidirectional decision-making and 
institutional setting of the state, and the variation of petition is another dimension 
reflecting the strength of state’s will in its policy implementation.  
 
																																								 																				
7	State	Bureau	for	Letters	and	Calls.	2015.	Reform	of	petitioning	system	needs	Rule	of	Law.	Assessed	on	January	11,	
2016.	http://www.gjxfj.gov.cn/2015-04/29/c_134196001.htm.		
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 If we accept the position of a “strong state”, does it mean that petitioners’ 
participation is essentially a compliance with the state, and the petitioning system is only 
established to prevent the excessive accumulation of grievances, which, to a certain 
extent, could threat the control of rulers? The answer is no. It can be identified from 
China’s experiences for decades that, in general, the majority of people have no intention 
to have “popular control over the government”, and they have a clear perception of the 
“ruler” and the “ruled” in-between which there lies an “impassable” line. Even during the 
turbulent, radical protesting period of late 1980s, what intellectuals advocated were the 
communication between state and people and limited state’s intervention in personal 
liberty, rather than the Western idea of democracy (Kelliher 1993, 381). Their calling for 
minzhu was actually a behavior of attributing the roots of corruption and governance 
inefficiencies to institutions, beneath which was the real impetus of voicing out “what we 
do not like”. In this sense, their collective petition and protest could be understood even 
as centripetal in pointing out the crucial problem of governance and promoting the state 
and government to function well.   
 
 With a similar expectation of good governance and social welfare, villagers in the 
grassroots society also appear to have a will of political participation, through which they 
can “make better locality”. The theoretical legitimacy of their political efficacy comes not 
only from the gist of the Regulation, but also from the historical experience of Chinese 
peasants. The Mass Line theory has a profound influence on villagers’ self-expectation, 
which has often been reinforced by a series of government policies. 
 
As is pointed out by President Xi, the mass line is our party’s lifeline and 
fundamental work route. The extensive practice of mass line education is a 
significant strategy to keep Party’s progressiveness and purity, in accordance with 
people’s expectation to overcome the within-party problem… Peasants are the main 
body of masses.8 
																																								 																				
8	See	Wang	Jianguo.	The	speech	on	the	agricultural	department	seminar	of	practices	of	mass	line	education.2013.		
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—— Wang Jianguo, 2013.  
 
 The willingness of participation has been covered by strong top-down control and 
mobilization of state. One prominent product of the state-led movement during the 1950s 
was the People’s commune (Renmin Gongshe), which functioned as both production 
organization and basic rural government. The strong organized, mobilized collective 
participation in agricultural/ industrial production and political movements of socialistic 
transition did not mean that the masses were only a policy receiver. Even during that time, 
although closely embroiled in state’s policies, petitioning, as well, never lost its 
participatory meaning. Despite the fact that it is, to a certain extent, a “managed 
participation” restricted to institutional and policy settings, peasants’ willingness could 
not be ignored at least in their struggle to improve the effectiveness of the system, i.e., to 
against corruption, local abusive governance, etc (Cai 2004, 444). 
 
2.5 “Ambiguous” intermediary: local cadres and grassroots autonomy 
  
In a narrow sense, local cadres are the communist party members of the village 
branch. But in practice, it refers to the village leadership-dangzheng ganby- that is 
composed of village party branch and village committee (cun liangwei banzi) since the 
end of People’s commune in the early 1980s and the establishment of rural governance 
system, of which the party branch is the leading core of “all village organizations and 
tasks”.  
 
To emphasize the importance of local cadre is based on its strategic position 
according to the mass line theory: 1) at the end of party structure and administrative 
bureaucratic system, local cadres are the direct executor carrying out policies from the 
center; 2) as the institutionally leadership in the grassroots society, local cadres are the 
core of village self-rule; 3) although the situation has changed from mobilizing villagers 
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to join the military or communist party before revolution period (Chen 1986),9 the “dual-
identity” of local cadre still complicates their role in-between local and hierarchical 
authorities. As village autonomy has taken place, local cadres are playing a vital role in 
the institutionalization of political mass line at the bottom level. When it is emphasized in 
the Regulation to control the petitioners at local, the interaction between village leaders 
and peasantry can, to a great extent, mirror the potential direction of petitioning system 
reform in the future.  
 
2.5.1 Institutional settings and peasant participation 
 
According to the mass line theory, peasants’ participatory petition can function as a 
means of information input in a capillary and efficient format, which actually appears to 
have the tendency of politically merging the state-society relationship and legitimating 
the role of democracy in strengthening CCP’s control at the bottom level (Shih 1999, 
321).10  The mechanism of this interaction-oriented participation lies in the village 
election and consultation at rural society. Changing from the totalitarian control of 
People’s commune, the decentralization and democratization in China’s countryside has 
provided the opportunity for peasants to participate in local affairs. Even the efficiency of 
consultation is still worth discussing, the direct election for village cadres leads to the 
possibility that peasants can make a difference in changing the decision group. This 
political opportunity, as well, has given political responsibilities to villagers themselves 
(Shih 1999, 158), i.e., they also have to undertake the risk of governance failure and 
abuses due to their participating in voting, which helps weaken the conflicting meaning 
of petition against administration in changing its role to a mechanism of self-examination.  
 
																																								 																				
9	Chen	Yung-fa.	Making	Revolution:	The	Communist	Movement	in	Eastern	and	Central	China,	1937-1945.	Vol.	1.	(Univ	
of	California	Press,	1986).	
10	See	Chih-Yu	Shih.	Is	collective	democracy	democracy?	(Collective	democracy:	political	and	legal	reform	in	China,	
1999):	321.	
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The “buffer zone” of local self-rule, however, is based on the presumption of 
mutually beneficial relationship between local cadres and the more “official” level of 
county government. According to the indigenized paradigm of “non-contentious politics”, 
the rational consideration of self-interest is an important explanatory factor of the 
petitioning behavior. Thus, when the privileged status and economic benefits have been 
reduced by upper or central policies, there is a tendency and possibility that local cadres 
may claimed their collective identity as affected petitioners together with peasantry, 
shifting the conflicting space “upward” within the government system (Wang 2012, 698).  
 
This potential change works through the peasantness in cadres’ dual identity 
resulting from village election: they not only can stand out as the agent of state leading 
the rural society, but also are able to go back to mobilize the network within village to 
extend their power into state. However, it is not to deny the confrontations between local 
cadres and villagers, during which cadres are playing the role of directly exerting state 
power through strong policy implementation or obstructing the channel of petition for 
their “performance evaluation” (jixiao kaohe) that in turn increases the possibility of 
“seeking justice from above” (Ying 2011, 122). 
 
The flexibility of their role, in general, has often been considered as a reactive 
response based upon a benefit-seeking logic, rather than due to a pursuit of political 
opportunity. When the democratic awareness of peasants has been widely considered in 
contemporary studies, this economic-incentive-induced explanation of local cadres in the 
system reform still needs further discussion.  
 
2.5.2 Everyday interaction and peasant participation 
 
 As is clarified in the domain of contentious politics, the focus of this framework is 
on “public, collective making of consequential claims” (McAdam et al. 2007, 2), which 
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has a strong explanatory power of causal relationship in taking a specific case as the 
subject of study. However, when applied to depicting the everyday, consistent interaction 
within a particular realm, it may come out insufficient. In reality, the fluid, “shifting” 
state-society boundary is not just a one-time change consequent to a definite event; 
instead, it is a constructive process being shaped through every single contact.  
 
This process, different from “political process” that centers on the influence of 
external economic transition on people’s “cognitive liberation” (McAdam 1982, 51), is 
formed by all aspects of life experiences, economically, culturally, politically, socially, 
etc. There are large amount of villages in North China still retaining the traditional format 
of face-to-face interpersonal communication due to relatively stable structure and layout, 
which is the basic context of all the reactive or proactive participation and interaction. 
This context, which I found through field study, is inclusive, sometimes even ambiguous, 
not only due to the mobility of role-interchange, but also as a response, politically and 
culturally, from tradition to modernity.  
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CHAPTER III: FIELDWORK 
 
3.1 Background  
 
The county, Pingding, has a long history since the Paleolithic Age (PXCC 1992, 1).11 It is 
located as the “gateway” of Shanxi and Hebei, which has been seen as a strategic hub 
with an important pass of the Great Wall-Niangziguan, also known as “the Barrier of 
Capital city” (Jing Ji Fan Ping). With a region span of 1,394 Square Kilometers (PXCC 
1992, 1), Pingding is surrounded by continuous mountains, and the land is rugged with 
dry soil, consequent to which is a less desirable condition for farming. Historically, the 
agricultural production in Pingding has long been lagging behind the average of Shanxi. 
In 1949, the crop yield per acre was only 90 kilogram (PXCC 1992, 2).  
Figure 3.1: Administrative division of Pingding County with research areas marked out.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Baidu Map. http://map.baidu.com/ Retrieved on Jan 1, 2016, 12:35 am. 
 
																																								 																				
11	PXCC, the abbreviation of Pingding Xianzhi Compilation Committee. 	
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Located at the south of Pingding, Zhangzhuang Town is one of the major 
agriculture centers in the county. It has farming land of 31,827 acres in loess soil, and the 
area of orchard reaches 3,280 acres (PXCC 1992, 16). When Pingding’s path of growth is 
categorized into one of the seven modes of township enterprises development in China, 
the determining factor of it associates with natural resources (Chen 1988). In 
Zhangzhuang, there are rich mineral resources, and it has 5 coalmines at both township 
and village level (PXCC 1992, 154-155) with verified coal reserves of 2.1 hundred 
million tons.12 Apart from mining, the carbon industry of the largest scale in the Northern 
China is located in Ningai (PXCC 1992, 16), and other resources, such as graphite and 
wacke, also have attracted foreign investment in the establishing of industrial factories 
during the marketization period. After decades of business development, Zhangzhuang 
has become one of the six largest marketplaces in Pingding.  
 
In contrast to the fast economic development in Zhangzhuang, Donghui appears 
to have a slow growth due to its complex landform, which is also an undesirable 
condition for the road and other infrastructure construction. Under the continuous 
mountains are rich mineral resources, including dolomite, quartz sand, silica, etc. (PXCC 
1992, 20), but they are hardly extracted. Since the village enterprise has been heavily 
dependent on the natural resources exploitation, apart from the self-employed business in 
town, there are only 6 main companies of quite small scales (PXCC 1992, 20) in Donghui. 
The general development mode shows a strong trace of the revolutionary period, and the 
main commodity transactions of people’s daily life are still conducted in the supply and 
marketing cooperatives (gongxiaoshe).  
 
3.2 Four Stories 
 
3.2.1 “I never participated” 
																																								 																				
12	The	data	is	available	on	Jin	Nong	Wang.	The	Introduction	to	Zhangzhuang.	
http://www.agri.com.cn/town/140321103000.htm	Retrieved	on	January	6,	2015.		
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Gao, a 42-year-old male, is one of the over 1,000 residents in Qigen village. Qigen is 
famous for the ambush warfare operated by the Eighth Route Army (Ba Lu Jun) during 
the second Sino-Japanese war, marking a vital event on the battlefield in Shanxi and the 
whole war. When talking about this history, Gao said, “We (Qigen villagers) are always 
willing to do what is good for people and the country”.  
 
After finishing his junior high school in Chuanquan, Donghui Town, Gao started to 
“work” as a salesman in a small grocery store operated by his mother. The store is one 
room of the cave dwelling (yaodong) in their courtyard. He enjoys hanging out around 
the village in the early morning. As observed by him, there have been many constructions 
about the monument, the square and things “of little practical use (mei sha shi ji zuo 
yong)”; on the contrary, “if they (cadres) can repair the road in he east area of the village, 
this is really ‘doing practical things (ban shi shi)’.” “Every time I take bus through that 
area, it feels like the bus is going to flip over in the ditch.”  
 
When the researcher asked whether he has petitioned regarding this issue, he 
responded with a shock, “Why petition? I don’t need to go to Beijing for such a small 
thing, and it’s of no use to go to Beijing and then to be sent back. I don’t want to make a 
mess (for the government and my village). I never participated in this kind of thing.” 
While asked whether he has talked about his concern with the village committee or the 
cadres, he answered without hesitation,  
 
“Sure I did! That day when our secretary of party committee came to buy some 
tarpaulin paper, I mentioned this problem… We had some talk. I told him that we 
could not develop our tourism without a good road. How do people driving from 
Shijiazhuang to Qigen think when they see this road?... I knew him a long time 
ago… He comes from the Dong Family here. He said he would go and see the 
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situation… I also wrote a letter online (on the Official Website of Pingding County 
Government), because my brother told me this is new that we can write letters 
directly to the mailbox of the county leader and the secretary. I thought maybe we 
could get some help from the county.”—— Gao13 
 
Dong, the secretary of the party committee in Qigen village, confirmed this situation 
when the researcher contacted him for the second time. He pointed out that the current 
road was constructed around ten (or more) years ago, the fund of which was collected 
from villagers and some successful representatives working outside of the village. Now 
the income of peasants is “just like that (jiu na yang)”, while the construction expense has 
increased a lot. Thus, the monetary support from the township and the county is very 
important.  
 
“We also want to repair our road. But you know, we just finished the construction of 
the Red Corridor (Hongse Zoulang) of several kilometers, and now our main focus 
is on the development of aquaculture, livestock breeding and planting industry, 
which needs a great number of investment into ‘digging deep wells (da shen 
jing)’… What he’s concerned about is right, but with the limitation of fund, we have 
to ‘poll resources to solve major problems (jizhong liliang ban dashi)’… Although 
the (broken) road is not the main road of tourism, it doesn’t mean that we will not 
fix it. But it takes time and money.”——Dong14 
 
Gao went to the area once after the first interview. When the researcher went to buy 
some drinks at his store, he mentioned his concern again. This time, he also recognized 
the effort of village building of the village head and the secretary. In his viewpoint, they 
both came back to the village “from their cozy life in the county”, and they are doing 
things “out of a goodwill”. He thought, his responsibility is to find something that may be 
																																								 																				
13	Interview	with	villager	Gao	in	Qigen	on	July	15,	2015.	
14	Interview	with	the	Secretary	of	Party	Committee,	Mr.	Dong,	in	Qigen	on	July	18,	2015.		
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ignored by them (cadres), and let them know. If needed, he also would like to offer his 
help. 
 
 
4.2.2 “I had two requests” 
 
Located in Zhangzhuang Town, Ningai is the village of the largest population scale in 
Pingding County.15 Different from Qigen, Ningai not only has the biggest carbon factory, 
two coalmines, or other joint ventures that can take in a large number of workforce, but 
also has one of the biggest provincial forest parks- Yaolinsi and other advantaged tourism 
resources. A large population size, a complex tangle of kinships through generations, and 
a continuous interaction with the outer world, feature the complexity of the relationships 
that the researcher has observed.  
 
Jing, born in 1950s, is a village woman that has a rich life experience, which is an 
epitome of one generation.16 She has gone through the famine years in her youth period; 
was involved in the Cultural Revolution era so that lost the opportunity to get higher 
education; the “Emulating Dazhai on Agriculture Campaign (Nongye Xuedazhai 
Yundong)” and the “Down to the Countryside Movement (Shangshan Xianxiang 
Yundong)” constrained her to the village; the entrepreneurship in the 1980s collapsed due 
to the corporate restructure; in the early 2000s she became a governmental personnel in 
Pingding, but “couldn’t adapt to the bureaucratic environment and after years resigned 
from the position”.17 After her daughter’s marriage, she came back to the village and 
organized a women association about the promotion of folk arts, members of which are 
expert in scissor-cut, making inwrought shoe-pad, and making Cloth Tiger.  
																																								 																				
15	The	information	was	acquired	from	secretary	Dong,	who	is	also	the	son-in-law	of	an	old	lady	in	Ningai.	The	official	
data	was	not	available.	According	to	the	Pingding	Xianzhi,	the	population	of	the	whole	Zhangzhuang	Town	ranked	5th	
of	all	the	townships.	The	interview	material.	July	18,	2015.	
16	The	name	“Jing”	here	is	a	pseudonym.	
17	As	per	the	interviewee’s	request,	the	detailed	information	is	confidential.		
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After seeing the accomplishment of the association, she felt that the village women 
also needed education, and some of them even showed the gift on writing. Thus, Jing 
decided to established a “Women Reading and Writing Group (Funv Dushu Xiezuo Hui)” 
in the village. Due to the fact that in the cave dwelling lived her mother and her cousin’s 
family, she could not hold this meeting every time at her place with a growing number of 
participants. Then she started to use her ancestral home in the north part of Ningai as their 
meeting location. However, started at the year of 2005, the transaction of the mineral 
resources underneath the North Hill (Bei Shan) and the following endless exploitation has 
caused geological changes, which resulted in the damages and cracks of the cave 
dwelling.  
 
After communication with peasants living nearby, she found that this was a common 
problem faced by a number of families. At first, she contacted the village head (a distant 
relative of her family) personally with three points: first, the extraction should be 
constrained within a safe scale; second, the village should provide funds for finding a 
new place for the meeting, because “women should also keep pace with the new village 
building (xin nongcun jianshe), and we should carry forward Shi Pingmei’s spirit, which 
is in accordance with county’s advocating”;18 third, this is not an individual issue and he 
should take care of the emotional villagers. However, the village head only said that he 
“will ask for more information”. 
 
“Then he (village head at that time) went to attend several conferences in Yangquan 
and Taiyuan. And after he came back it had been two weeks; nothing was heard from 
him. Some peasants had already addressed their concern to the village committee, but 
this was a very complex issue… Within committee itself there were people of 
different opinions about the exploitation already for years. During one meeting, one 
																																								 																				
18	Shi	Pingmei	is	a	famous	writer.	Born	in	Pingding,	she	is	also	known	as	one	of	the	“Four	Talented	Women	in	the	
Republic	of	China”.	
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of our members proposed to write a joint letter to both village head and secretary, 
which got the consent of all the other members, and I was chosen as the leading 
petitioner. I told them it was ok but I had two requests that we had to do so in the 
name of our women reading group, and our main topic was about finding a new 
place… I explained that if we include those (affected) peasants, our problems would 
become compressed into one, that is, the exploitation should be stopped and we 
should get compensation… It’s not an easy thing to do. If they (cadres) couldn’t 
solve this problem, no one would listen to our own demand. ” ——Jing19 
 
The women group finally got a room next to the square as their meeting place. In the 
meantime, she also contacted her previous colleagues in the county government 
personally about the exploitation. “I just asked whether they knew who’s in charge… I 
hoped he (village head) could have a conversation with the peasants and find a solution.” 
 
 
4.2.3 “Cadres come to my house” 
 
Lihuangan is a small village with hundreds of residents.20 With a similar farming 
situation with Qigen, Lihuangan is even more disadvantaged in its location in the 
mountains and the lack of mineral/cultural resources. Without the township enterprise, it 
is a pure agricultural village. 
 
Zhu is a middle-aged farmer born in Lihuangan. After completing primary school 
education, he began apprenticing to a carpenter.21 He had also learned zurna by himself 
and joined the village rites and music band (li yue dui). During the 1990s, the individual 
																																								 																				
19	Interview	with	the	head	of	women	reading	and	writing	group,	Mrs.	Jing,	in	Ningai	on	July	23,	2015.		
20	Information	is	acquired	through	a	conversation	with	the	head	of	village	healthcare	station.	Interviewed	on	July	19,	
2015.	
21	The	name	“Zhu”	here	is	a	pseudonym.	
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contract with transport companies for inter-village transportation became popular. Zhu 
was one of the three bus drivers taking the route from Pingding to Qingyangshu, the 
border village at the very south of Pingding. However, since entering into 2010, the 
transport company with which he signed the contract was incorporated into the Pingding 
passenger transport corporation under the direct administration of the Traffic Authority. 
What this reorganization has caused was the constraint on the aptitude of drivers: at least, 
they had to pass online examination and road test. For Zhu, it was very unlikely to get the 
certificate due to his limited literacy.  
 
“I am illiterate... Primary school? What could we learn there? Nothing… One teacher, 
a dozen students from first grade to sixth… I came to babysit my sister…yes I 
brought her with me to the classroom, so that my parents could farm.”—— Zhu22 
 
The problem was, his wife also worked on his bus as a ticket seller. When he could 
not work, both of them lost their jobs. His children were still at school. Thus, the family 
source of income was totally cut off.  
 
“I came to Pingding… to ask them (people in the corporation) what I should do in 
this situation. I’ve been safely driving for a dozen years without even one accident. 
But they told me that ‘this is the rule; we can’t help.’ … Not only myself, there were 
several old drivers who couldn’t get the certificate. What could we do? We came to 
the (Pingding) Traffic Bureau. One of us knew a guy there… He called him out and 
we asked whether we could get a certificate. He replied that this was a uniform 
requirement to realize standardized operation… I asked what if we asked someone to 
intervene (zhao zhao ren)…”——Zhu23 
 
																																								 																				
22	Interview	with	the	farmer	Zhu	in	Lihuangan	on	July	27,	2015.	
23	Interview	with	the	farmer	Zhu	in	Lihuangan	on	July	27,	2015.	
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His sister was married in Tao’s family, which has a relatively large kinship network 
spreading from local to Beijing.24 The husband of his sister has a cousin, which was the 
township head of Donghui. Through this channel, Zhu contacted the township head, Bai, 
and expressed his worrying about his living and asked whether Bai could help him to stay 
in the company.  
 
“Did I think of taking other measures? What do you mean? Yes… I mentioned it in 
one all-village meeting when we were talking about the farming land and the money-
raising for irrigation … My land was rented out, while then I wanted to have it 
back…Our village head was very nice; he came to visit me the other day, and asked 
me whether I have difficulty in supporting my children’s study… He also asked if 
anyone wanted to sell his farming land during another village meeting…Yes, because 
some families had already moved to the county… Only the elders were left here. ” —
—Zhu25 
 
Bai replied that he would ask about the situation in Pingding. Zhu contacted the man 
with acquaintance in the Traffic Bureau and asked him to visit “the one in charge (guan 
shi de)” together.26 Finally, with the help of the “insider”, they had a meeting with one of 
the leaders in the Traffic Bureau- Fang.27  
 
“We told him our situation… He said he knew it but couldn’t make an exception for 
us. This was the order from the top (shangmian yaoqiu). I said, ‘while you have your 
reason, I have mine. I don’t want to give you trouble, but you can’t do things like this. 
How do we make a living then? How could I support the education of my sons?’”—
—Zhu28 
																																								 																				
24	The	name	“Tao”	here	is	a	pseudonym.	
25	Interview	with	the	farmer	Zhu	in	Lihuangan	on	July	27,	2015.	
26	The	name	and	position	of	this	man	is	confidential	based	on	Zhu’s	request.		
27	The	name	“Fang”	here	is	a	pseudonym	based	on	Zhu’s	request.	
28	Interview	with	the	farmer	Zhu	in	Lihuangan	on	July	27,	2015.	
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When asked about petition, Zhu expressed his idea that petition meant “cadres 
coming to my house”; one of the examples was the village head. From his point of view, 
the core of petition was “ to find difficulties and to solve problems (faxian wenti, jiejue 
wenti)”.  
 
4.2.4 “We want our money back” 
 
The fourth story also happened in Ningai village. When an attempt was made to contact 
the affected people of the “North Hill exploitation”, Wu, a middle-aged woman, told a 
story of why these affected people were so unhappy with the previous village head.  
 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the previous state-owned coalmine in Pingding has 
undergone a long-time decentralization from localization, collectivization to 
individualization of contracting. Zhuang (the previous village head contacted by Jing), 
the eldest son of the largest family in local, was one of the village community members.29 
With a sharp business sense, Zhuang proposed to raise money from all villagers to one 
person and sign the contract in the name of that person. Zhuang convinced villagers and 
promised that all the participating households would share the bonus based on their inputs 
since it started to make a profit. In the light of the fact that Zhuang was the initiator and 
his family had a high reputation among all the big families in local, he was chosen as the 
representative.  
 
“After years, he (Zhuang) reconstructed his old bungalow into a two-floor house… 
Us? We got two or three thousand yuan. And after he became the village head, he and 
the secretary sold our land (not the farming land) to the outsiders (wai di ren)…From 
																																								 																				
29	The	name	“Zhuang”	here	is	a	pseudonym.	
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the hearsay we got the information that they planned to sell five hills. Villagers 
strongly opposed! A number of villager’s groups visited the cadres and committee to 
complain… Then finally they sold four, and for the North Hill they sold 1,000 acres 
rather the whole area. But, where’s our compensation of their selling our collective 
land? In fact, Zhuang is competent; at least he supported village housing construction, 
village education, and established the north park. The secretary is the bad guy; he can 
do nothing except for getting money from our land by colluding with county 
cadres… Last time in the village party branch meeting, Yang (a party member in the 
first sub-branch) mentioned the dividend from selling the land and had a quarrel with 
the secretary. Zhuang then promised we would get 3,000 yuan per household after we 
argued several times on the all-village meetings… But (he got) that much of money, 
how could we get this little? Our house is cracked… we have to get our money back.” 
—— Wu30 
 
Wu checked the “code of ethics for cadres (ganbu lianjie congzheng xingwei guifan)” 
online and showed it to the researcher. “This is why Zhuang and other village cadres 
were dismissed in 2010,”said Wu, “it was on TV.” As her husband said, there were many 
times a dozen of villagers went to Zhuang’s office and the party branch to ask for money; 
the county government was also been visited by groups of peasants for several times. 
“When peasants went to Pingding, they (county cadres) just provided poor answers and 
said they would look into the issue,” said Wu’s husband, “we knew they (village and 
county cadres) are in the same line (yi huo de).”  
 
Some villagers and Jing confirmed that as far as they knew, villagers also went to 
Yangquan and Provincial government to ask for intervention. However, what changed the 
situation was the exposure on CCTV (China Central Television) of the illegal 
exploitation in the name of the construction of agricultural zone in Ningai; then it was 
followed a shift of attitude of officials: Yangquan government started to investigate 
																																								 																				
30	Interview	with	the	farmer	Wu	and	her	husband	in	Ningai	on	July	24,	2015.	
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quickly and put this issue to an end- village cadres and related county cadres were off 
stage. “We got limited compensation, and there is no where for us to get our due 
dividend.” Said the unsatisfied couple.  
	
Table 4.1 Basic information of the four cases of petition  
 Donghui Pingding Zhangzhuang 
Location Qigen Lihuangan & 
Pingding 
county 
Ningai 
 
Case Broken village road Transportation 
reform 
The cracked 
meeting room 
Village dividend 
and land 
compensation  
Petition scale Individual Small group  Medium group 
with a leader 
A series of 
Medium groups  
Modes of 
petition 
Contact village 
cadres; letter 
writing online to 
county officials 
Visit 
administrative 
unit; contact 
county cadres 
Contact village 
cadres; letter 
writing to 
village officials 
Visit village 
office and city 
government 
Resources No Personal 
network 
Personal 
network, 
education, 
reputation 
Unknown  
Outside 
intervention 
No Township head No CCTV, 
Yangquan 
government 
Strategies to 
influence 
“Necessary for 
village tourism” 
“No income 
resource; 
children might 
stop study” 
“Good for 
women”; keep in 
line with the 
County; own 
cultural heritage 
Code of ethics 
for cadres 
Petitioners’ 
Background 
Uniform  Similar  Elite-mass  Similar  
Forms of 
petition 
Communication Seeking help Seeking help Seeking justice 
Results Secretary’s oral 
promise  
Petitioners 
could not stay 
at the old 
Petitioners’ 
meeting room 
application was 
Villagers got 
limited 
compensation; 
village cadres 
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company approved were dismissed; 
a portion of land 
was protected  
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CHAPTER Ⅳ: DISCUSSION 
 
4.1 Between Motivations and Demands 
 
Seeing political interactions as an adaptive, fluid system, David Easton elaborates a 
mechanism of “stimulus-system-response-outcome” (Easton 1967, 38) in explaining the 
decision-making process, the central informational “input” which associates with 
“demands”, that is, the express of grievances and discontents (Easton 1967, 41). 
Motivations, as distinguished from demands, can be seen as an incentive to the action of 
input.  
 
The cases of petitioners have shown interesting patterns of discrepancies and 
similarities between motivations and demands in villages of Shanxi. In the first case, 
what stimulated Gao was the broken, rough road leading to a terrible experience of taking 
the bus, which motivated him to raise voice and make demands from a perspective of 
collective interest and potential gains for the village’s current project. The second case is 
in the opposite when Jing drafted the formal petitioning letter and contacted the county 
official personally: the motivation was for a big collective interest (affected villagers’ 
interest), but the demand made was on behalf of the women group. Both the third and 
fourth cases, however, showed more uniformity of motivations and demand making. 
Zhu’s case is simpler; what caused his discontent was the introduction of stringent 
occupational standard, and what he really petitioned for was to eliminate this policy that 
had adversely affected his livelihood. For Ningai villagers, both the motivation and 
demand were about the monetary compensation.  
 
The discrepancies and similarities reflect the existence of shared understanding of 
a certain “unwritten consensus” between the villagers and cadres, which has two 
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important meanings: first, petitioners use strategies to justify their stance when making a 
demand; second, this “justification” does not necessarily link to the “correctness” of their 
behaviors, but associates with legitimate discourse on cadres, morally of social 
expectations and legally of central regulations, that is, to use the languages and rhetoric 
of the powerful (O’Brien & Li 2006, 2). However, peasants’ giving voice to a demand in 
the languages of cadres is not limited to “curb the exercise of power” (O’Brien 2013, 
1052); in reality, situations can also vary from seeking justice, seeking help to even 
communicative suggestion.  
 
With specific situations, demands made by petitioners are essentially one, that is, 
to depend on the legitimate ruling power to “solve the problem”. In any sense, peasants 
need the intervention from the “ruler”, which has various contextual meanings and scales 
that can be adjusted based upon petitioners’ demand: in Gao’s case, the “ruler” has a 
more concrete image, that is, the one who has the legitimacy to mobilize resources to 
repair the road, while in Ningai villagers eyes, the normative obligation of the “ruler” 
emphasized by the central party-state is more important that can be used to legitimate 
their moral stance to bypass local authorities even this behavior violates the institutional 
regulation. Peasants’ ability to “discern” the central- local inconsistencies to expand their 
political space mirrors their rising political awareness (Wang 2012, 701). However, from 
the cases one can see that, instead of cultivating a directly contentious aim, that peasants 
address their discontents and grievances or even engage in the resistance in order to 
articulate interest rather than raise protest.  
 
4.2 To Make a Difference 
 
Recognizing the dependence of peasants on the ruling power to pursuit the interest of 
their personal lives, the behavioral logic of petitions and appeals made by them can be 
divided into three categories: first, to engage in cronyism with authorities of direct 
potential influence; second, to borrow power from the upper level to accelerate the 
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process towards the desirable direction; third, to fulfill their responsibility in the Mass 
Line system.  
 
In Tianjian Shi’s study of appeals and adversarial activities in Beijing, one of the 
two categories associated with cronyism is “interest articulation through instrumental 
personal ties” to “change the policy output” at local rather than to change the policy itself 
(Shi 1997, 253, 264). By this definition, the contacting actions in previous three cases are 
appropriately interpreted as interest-articulating form of cronyism. Whereas in Shi’s 
argument that engaging in cronyism tends to be a reactive strategy for people feel 
restricted in their expressive communication about politics rather for people with more 
tangible and intangible resources, the interviewees in the field research, instead, have 
behaved differently.  
 
While argued by Shi that cronyism is a strategy chosen by disadvantaged group to 
build an exchange relationship with cadres (Shi 1997, 256), what the researcher has found 
during the fieldwork is that cronyism could also be proactive-which happens as the first 
choice for peasants to get information from the official for both issue-specific 
information and on cadres attitudes without entering into a formal ruler-ruled relationship. 
Besides, it is not a strategy that belongs to the disadvantaged group. For the women 
activist Jing, she had a broad network resources and socioeconomic status; nevertheless, 
she still chose to articulate her interest in private first with the cadre that she had a closer 
relationship with. If the concept of “disadvantaged” is defined, as is presented in Shi’s 
chapter conclusion, as the blocked traditional channels faced by interest-articulators, most 
of the interviewees, however, did not choose to petition to the Letters and Visits Office 
even though it is advocated by the central state and can be easily accessed.  
 
When Shi illustrates the “expressive costs of cronyism” of people’s psychological 
orientations can be overcome by the always-practiced community norms (Shi 1997, 257-
258), in this study, it is not a very suitable explanation for the situation in the three 
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villages. The prerequisite of this argument lies in the close linkage between the perceived 
high cost and cronyism. However, issues of these villages have presented an interesting 
fact that what associates with cronyism is a lower rather than a higher cost of interest 
articulation. The complex, expansive and intertwined kinship has “informalized” the 
activity of contacting officials through their personal ties; besides, the to-get-the-
information logic of peasants also lowered the possible risk that could have been created 
by cadres if villagers’ behavior could bring negative effect on them.  
 
Secondly, to borrow power from the upper level is not a new topic when looking 
at the academic field of contentious politics. Basically, it is understood as a strategy to 
change the current power relationship between peasants and related cadres (Shi 1997, 
230), to overcome the “structural disadvantages” (Sewell 2001, 55) and to create political 
opportunities for the peasants themselves. Rather than challenging the existing studies, 
cases in the fieldwork chapter may follow the logic of changing the disadvantaged 
situation, as instead of taking actions out of a purpose to alter the hierarchical ruler-ruled 
relationship, peasants chose to realize interest and to accelerate this process (i.e. Gao’s 
online letter-writing) dependent on the exact relationship, which may have created 
opportunities for their economic gains while reinforcing the existing ruling legitimacy. In 
this respect, it is hard to say that the structural disadvantages have been essentially 
changed. Besides, when it might cost less to get upper power involved in a relatively 
small-scale acquaintance society, such as the township area, the cost of inviting officials 
in a larger, formal community stepping into the local affairs rises with both the potential 
pressure from local involved cadres and the limited information about the relationship 
between officials and local cadres on the related issue. In Ningai village’s case, the non-
action of the county leaders was found to be as the consequence of their close 
involvement in the land issue. 
 
However, it is not to say that due to the high cost, this power-borrowing petition 
will always fail. The discrepancies between, or the co-existence of the central and local 
ruling logic have a long history. From the imperial “state ruling stops at county level (guo 
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quan bu xia xian) (Qin, Huang 2003, 2) to the contemporary dual system of politics (He 
2004, 2) , the state-grassroots society (chao-ye) relationship has witnessed a historical 
institutional transition during a long time period. Nevertheless, to interpret the “dual 
systems” as a detached village ruling of the top-down system does not accord with the 
context in China. Although since early 1980s the village autonomy has been emphasized 
and practiced as a “rebuilding of collective identity” (Shih 1997, 259) in the countryside 
of China, which also marks a significant part of China’s political democratization, it does 
not mean a decline of state control in the basic levels.31 Besides, to win the hearts of 
peasants is not a practice only needed during the village elections, it also mirrors the 
legitimacy for the ruling party. Thus, from the perspective of the state, or the “official” 
institutions within the top-down system from central to city level, it has the ability and is 
legitimacy to intervene when it is needed. 
 
The past experience in Ningai shows that the report on CCTV quickly “activated” 
the non-active city government. Although the researcher has not acquired exact 
information about how the central media decided to investigate the situation, as per some 
grapevine rumor, “Someone has written report letters to the central government”. Even 
we do not know the reasons in fact, the central-local discrepancies do have created some 
space for keeping the ruler’s image of credibility and accountability, which is different 
from the discredited local cadres and always in line with the masses. Thus, when the 
petitioning voice emerging from a local policy implementation reaches at a high level, the 
cost could be even lower than at the low echelon of the top-down system, because it 
jumps out of the complex local interest chain and the state can also win people’s heart. 
One may quote the Regulations on Letters and Visits to deny the effect of petition 
bypassing the hierarchical bureaucracies; however, the central power not only exists 
within the party or governmental institutions, but also in other institutional organs, for 
instance, the official and mainstream media, which can function as a representative voice 
of the state, further lowering the cost of this action.   
 
																																								 																				
31	See	Shin,	especially	Chapter	4,	for	an	insightful	analysis.		
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Thirdly, an interesting finding of petitions in the countryside of Pingding consists 
in peasants’ divergent perceptions of petition itself with what they really did in reality. 
For Gao, petition is to resort to the highest ruling power (“Beijing”), but this action is of 
no use for the situation and may also create instability that is opposite of harmonious 
society, or bring trouble to his village (“to make a mess for the government and village”), 
and the petitioners are very likely to be sent back. Different from Gao’s negative 
impression, Zhu holds a positive viewpoint towards petition, that is, the rulers actively 
contact the ruled in the grassroots to get the information about the difficulties faced by 
the ruled (“cadres coming to my house”). Even though with distinctive perceptions, there 
are two common implications behind these seemingly divergent expressions. First, people 
take the “natural” existence of ruling power for granted in any respect; second, the 
communication with officials is a way of problem solving in peasants’ individual life. 
The difference, however, is not fundamentally contradictory, but lies in the perspectives 
of two villagers, that is, while the former emphasizes the individual responsibility to the 
state (the government), the latter presents the normative duty of the cadres towards the 
ordinary people.  
 
More than a single method of leadership in the policy making process (Blecher 
1979, 108), the Mass Line is a philosophical system of ruling adopted in campaigns, 
movements as well as regime building and democratization process in contemporary 
China. While scholars mainly analyzed the “correctness” (Blecher 1979, 107) and the 
effectiveness of power centralization (Shih 1997, 156-158), the rationale behind the 
discussions above exactly explains the sustainability of the Mass Line system from the 
other side. First, masses recognize the positions of cadres/rulers and themselves in the 
system; second, petition is basically a process of issue-specific communication; third, 
from the perspective of villagers, the relationship in terms of the responsibility is bilateral. 
When thinking one step further, this bilateral responsibility is non-equivalent, because for 
peasants, the responsibility is for the communicative system, which is designed, 
interpreted, and practiced by the party-state, whereas for the cadres the responsibility 
comes from its dominant power in the taken-for-granted ruler-ruled hierarchy. Thus, the 
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seemingly divergent behaviors (with petitioners’ own perceptions) become easy to 
understand, that is, their positive perception on the state-society relationship and 
proactive participation in system.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The recent half-century has witnessed the exploratory transition of political reform in 
China, during which the institutional construction of petition system is continuously 
shaped and reshaped by the participation of the actors in the grassroots society. Therefore, 
to look at the current situation of petitioners’ involvement is not only a necessity to test    
the existing diagrams of interpreting the state-society relationship in current Chinese 
context, but also present with a image regarding how the Chinese theory of democracy 
with socialism characteristics is practiced in people’s daily connection with officials and 
active fulfillment of the role in the system.  
 
 This research made an attempt to examine the context, nature and 
operationalization of collective petition in rural China, in order to get insights into the 
rationales behind peasants’ objectives, involvement and attainment in the process of 
petitioning. It is found in this study that the peasants’ petition is mainly to seek help and 
intervention from the system to realize the individual interest on a segmented basis or 
within a simple-structured elite-mass group, which is proactive and participatory in the 
sense of information communication. The contention is issue-based and exists in local, 
but the fundamental relationship between rural petitioners and the political system in 
China is non-contentious, and the hierarchical ruler-ruled relationship is not only 
recognized but also practiced in peasants’ appealing actions.  
 
 With the limited empirical materials, the current information available has pointed 
to interesting phenomena, a better understanding of which, however, needs a more 
comprehensive data about the specific issues and individual’s personal diachronic 
experiences associated with them. Still, there are questions needing further research: why 
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is the cronyism the First Choice of petitioners? Why did not petitioners resort to the 
Letters and Visits Office?  
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